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SUMMARY 
 
  The main aim of this paper is to check one of the few existing theories regarding the 
factors that can explain the historical dissolution of collective rustic property, namely the 
Neo-Malthusian thesis which underlies the so-called “tragedy of the commons”. This old 
interpretative proposal, originating in the field of Biology, but rapidly adopted by Economy, 
not only continues to be explicitly present in some manuals of natural resources management, 
but also persists in those works that, from Economic and Social History, attempt to 
understand the reasons of the decline of communal systems in the Western world. Leaving 
aside the revision that, in the last decades, New Institutional Economy has advanced in this 
respect through the “property rights theory”, which is difficult to contrast, my paper tries to 
test the applicability of the Neo-Malthusian schema with the help of elementary econometric 
methods. The testing ground chosen for this purpose is the process of disintegration of 
communal lands which took place in Spain since the middle of the 18
th century and, 
especially, the process of privatisation promoted by the Law of General Disentitlement of 1 
May 1855. In no way does this analysis attempt to create a refined econometric model with 
which to explain the changes in collective patrimony during the last centuries. The inclusion 
in the test of other factors, different from the ones emphasised in the “tragedy of the 
commons”, suggests and advances some possible approaches to assemble an alternative 
theoretical schema, but does not endeavour to offer a global mechanical explanation. 
 
Keywords: tragedy of the commons, Neo-Malthusian thesis, privatisation process, collective rustic 
patrimony, Spain, Extremadura, econometric methods 




  El principal objetivo de este documento es contrastar una de las pocas teorías 
existentes acerca de los factores que pueden explicar la disolución histórica de la propiedad 
rústica colectiva: la tesis neo-maltusiana que subyace tras la denominada “tragedia de los 
comunales”. Esta vieja propuesta interpretativa, nacida en el campo de la Biología pero 
rápidamente adoptada por la Economía, no sólo continúa estando presente en algunos 
manuales de gestión de recursos naturales, sino que también persiste en aquellos trabajos que, 
desde la Historia Económica y Social, intentan comprender las razones del declive de los 
sistemas comunales en el mundo occidental. Dejando al margen la revisión que durante las 
últimas décadas ha hecho al respecto la Nueva Economía Institucional a través de la “teoría de 
los derechos de propiedad”, difícil de contrastar en la práctica, mi trabajo intenta poner a 
prueba la aplicabilidad del esquema neo-maltusiano con la ayuda de métodos econométricos 
elementales. El campo de prueba elegido para ello es el proceso de desintegración de tierras 
comunales que tuvo lugar en España desde mediados del siglo XVIII y, especialmente, el 
proceso de privatización promovido por la Ley de Desamortización General de 1 de mayo de 
1855. En ningún caso este análisis pretende crear un refinado modelo econométrico con el 
que explicar los cambios producidos en el patrimonio colectivo durante las últimas centurias. 
La inclusión en el test de otros factores, distintos a los subrayados en la “tragedia de los 
comunales”, sugiere y avanza algunas posibles vías para construir un esquema teórico 
alternativo, pero no trata de ofrecer una explicación mecánica global. 
 
Palabras Clave: tragedia de los comunales, tesis neomaltusiana, proceso de privatización, patrimonio 
rústico colectivo, España, Extremadura, métodos econométricos 
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Antonio M. Linares 
(Universidad de Extremadura) 
 
I.  The tragedy of the commons: the persistent inheritance of Malthus 
 
  In 1968, after some years of certain stagnation in the enduring discussion regarding 
the historical development of collective property
2, the biologist-geneticist Garrett Hardin, 
almost unconsciously, revived the controversy with the publication in Science of a small essay 
entitled “The Tragedy of the Commons”. The main objective of this article was not to analyse 
the determining factors of the survival or the dissolution of communal property. From his 
Darwinian academic vocation, Hardin used the question of the commons to criticise “the 
policy of laissez-faire in reproduction” that inspired the sexual education programmes 
advocated by the United Nations and other international organisations in those days. 
According to Hardin, “to couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone 
born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action”
3. 
  The biologist maintained that the exploitation of collective surfaces in general and of 
communal lands in particular, supposedly shared by a multitude of individuals (“open to all”), 
inevitably leads to the exhaustion of natural resources. Every user, interpreted by Hardin as a 
rational maximizer who receives positive utility from his own exploitation and negative utility 
from overexploitation, tends to use up the commons and, by doing so, manages to increase his 
individual profit while sharing the costs of degradation among the rest of the community. This 
situation, directly related to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, may work out satisfactorily for centuries 
because war, poaching and disease (Malthus’s positive checks) keep the number of both men 
and beasts far below the capacity of the land. Finally, however, the day of reckoning comes. 
At this point, “the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy”
4. 
  In view of this relentless logic, what should be done? In Hardin’s opinion, there are 
only two options: sell collective lands off as private property or keep them as public property, 
but allocating the right to access them. The first solution (privatisation) permits the 
incorporation of environmental costs into an overall framework of responsible management 
and, therefore, restricts the degradation. The second one (nationalisation) guarantees the 
controlled exploitation of public assets and, consequently, may avoid the exhaustion. No case 
can be made for the persistence of common management because, in a world governed by the 
principle of “dog eats dog”, individual decisions always lead to collective disaster. 
                                                 
1 The preparation of this paper has been possible thanks to Alfonso Herranz and Miguel Vermehren. Without 
their generous help, neither the econometric exercises nor the language aspects would be the same. The faults of 
the work, however, are only responsibility of the author. 
2 For a good synthesis on this subject, see Sala (1996). 
3 Hardin (1968: 1246). 
4 Hardin (1968: 1244).   5
  Accordingly, it is evident that the theoretical schema of Hardin’s thesis relies on the 
disputed assumption which sustains that man is selfish by nature. From this perspective, the 
opposition to the “tragedy of the commons” is only part of a more combative line of thought 
that not only questions the historical validity of Neo-Malthusian approaches, but also rejects 
the veracity of the principles governing the idea of competitive individualism. Obviously, at 
the core of contemporary disapproval of Hardin’s theory lie the sanctification of “homo 
economicus” and the motivational criteria which go with it in Neoclassical Economy
5. What 
is at stake is, therefore, an old and complex polemic that, of course, transcends the objective 
of my work and which is difficult to clarify with empirical evidence. 
  The criticism of the freedom of use that Hardin attributes to the communal lands is 
much less problematic. In this respect, the principal error of “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
is to suppose that collective ownership means “open access” to the communal assets for all 
individuals (“open to all”), implicitly concluding that collective property is equivalent to no 
property
6. This supposition, still present in many manuals of Economy, is plainly refuted by 
historical evidence, which demonstrates that exploitation of the communal assets in the past 
was rarely characterised by a total absence of restrictions
7. In most cases, the rights of use 
were restricted to members of a defined community and were regulated by clearly understood 
institutional norms, which generally took into account the regeneration of natural resources. It 
is true that customary controls were not entirely able to avoid the existence of abuse in the use 
of the commons, but then neither has State regulation nor privatisation historically guaranteed 
the conservation of natural resources
8. 
  The force of the empirical argument used by historical critics of the thesis of “open 
access” has become so evident that Hardin has had to revise his own theory, restricting the 
“tragedy of the commons” to a “tragedy of the unmanaged commons”
9. In this revision, 
however, the biologist-geneticist continues to defend his earlier Malthusian principles. In 
essence, he sustains that collective property is justifiable only under conditions of low 
demographic and livestock density. As human population has increased, “the commons has 
had to be abandoned in one aspect after another”
10. 
                                                 
5 See, among others, Martínez-Alier (1992) and Naredo (1996). 
6 A theoretical revision of this error can be looked up in Aguilera (1991). 
7 See, for example, Wade (1987) and Stevenson (1991). 
8 Indeed, for some critics, it was precisely the process of “decommunalisation” which broke up the social fabric 
of many pre-industrial societies and caused sustainability problems in the rural world. This idea, which is 
grouped around the thesis of the “tragedy of enclosures”, sustains that the user of a collective surface is not only 
and exclusively a self-centred “homo economicus” who inevitable exploits the medium at his neighbours’ 
expense. In small communities, conflict co-exists with cooperation. These are not so much altruist forms of 
cooperation as mechanisms to limit competition. The implicit condition that governs the interaction between 
community members is that the greater the possibility of reprimand or censure, the greater the probability of 
collaboration. From this perspective, privatisation or nationalisation, rather than guaranteeing the conservation of 
resources, can lead to the “tragedy of the commons”, from the moment they induce the forced violation of 
traditional norms of management and asset renewal. See, on this subject, the interpretations of Thompson (1976) 
(1991), McCay and Acherson (1987), Berkes (1989), Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), González de Molina (1991), 
McNeill (1992) or Neeson (1993) (1996). 
9 Hardin (1994). 
10 Hardin (1968: 1248).   6
  It is precisely regarding the Malthusian component that the criticism has shown a 
more flexible stance. Among other reasons, because, beyond Hardin’s ecological alarmism in 
connection with the collective use of natural resources, the demographic factor does seem to 
possess a certain relevance for the analysis of the survival or dissolution of common property. 
Both from an eco-socialist perspective (relationship between population growth and social 
sharing of productive resources)
11 and from the evolutionary focus of transaction costs in 
New Institutional Economy (relationship between the size of the group and capacity of 
negotiation)
12, Hardin may be partly right when he asserts that the commons are only viable in 
rural communities of a reduced scale. 
  For this point, the unfortunate assumption of “open access” does not invalidate the 
likely applicability of his thesis. Even if it is accepted that the right of entry to commons is 
historically restricted to members of a defined neighbourhood, it is equally possible to accept 
that the demographic growth of the community influences the quotas of exploitation of the 
surfaces traditionally assigned to collective use. Unless, of course, the traditional rules which 
control the communal system only guarantee the shared use to the original settlers of a 
specific neighbourhood and not to the given population at any point in time. 
  In Spain, the latter is the case only in the so-called montes de varas or montes de voces 
in Galicia, but it is not to be found in most of the traditional models of common exploitation. 
Before the liberal reform of the first half of the 19
th century, the different forms of access that 
were established across the country were essentially based on neighbourhood rights. The 
constitution of a new family, the ownership of land in the municipality, the tenancy of a house 
in the village or the payment of municipal taxes were the type of circumstances that usually 
determined, in Spain, the form of use and access to collective rustic patrimony
13. In view of 
this and in line with Hardin’s theory, it seems logical to wonder if, in the Spanish case, the 
tendency to redefine common property inevitably emerged as soon as the hypothetical level of 
balance between population and livestock density and natural resources was surpassed
14. 
  The main aim of my work is to attempt to verify this thesis by using the empirical 
evidence available for the privatisation of communal lands which took place in Spain since 
the middle of the 18
th century putting liberal thinking into practice. The data recently 
collected by me for Extremadura, one of the region most affected by such a process, together 
with the figures published for other zones of Spain over the last years, permit to check 
Hardin’s theory with basic econometric methods. Using these, I will not try to corroborate or 
to reject the general importance of density (population and livestock) in the historical 
development of property rights. My only objective is to check, with the help of econometrics, 
if the Spanish privatisation followed the path set out by “The Tragedy of the Commons”. The 
reason is very simple: even though the same legal system was being applied in the whole of 
Spain since the middle of the 18
th century, the privatisation process did not have a similar 
effect on all Spanish regions. Could population and livestock density be a determinant part of 
the difference? 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, Sarkar (1993). 
12 Noorgard (1995). 
13 Concerning this subject, see, Nieto (1964) and Mangas (1981). 
14 Hardin (1968: 1244 and 1248).   7
II.   The privatisation of public woodlands in Spain (1859-1925) 
 
  While the dissolution of communal lands in Spain is a long-term process which can be 
said to have begun at the same time as the Christian Reconquest (12
th and 13
th centuries), it is 
generally accepted today that the process of disintegration became general around the middle 
of the 18
th century. The turning point in this development was the critical analysis of the 
Spanish Enlightenment regarding common property. However and despite the fact that some 
regions were targeted with special privatisation laws by the Monarchy since 1750, the 
redefinition of collective lands in Spain throughout the second half of the 18
th century was 
more a spontaneous event than a regulated process conducted by the State. In fact, 
government control of privatisation did not begin to be a visible reality until the consolidation 
of the liberal régime in 1833. From that point on, legally speaking, all local communities were 
free to sell part of their patrimony with the purpose of reducing municipal debt. Nevertheless, 
though many villages made use of this possibility, the process of privatisation in Spain was 
only accelerated by the Law of General Disentitlement of 1
 May 1855
15. 
  In contrast with previous privatisation laws, this act, which was applied until 1924, not 
only authorized the partial sale of communal lands but, in fact, actually obliged Spanish 
municipalities to sell almost all of their rustic patrimony at public auction. The new liberal 
State only exempted from sale those lands of collective use in the strict sense of the 
expression (communal and gratuitous exploitation) and some old communal and municipal 
woodlands characterised by a specific ecological potentiality. The latter were, from then on, 
considered “woodlands of public utility” on account of their environmental value and were 
managed and, later, exploited by the Central Administration.  
  The main criterion for the exception of these surfaces (woodlands of public utility), to 
which liberal legislation added some other civil and State forests, was centred on the 
“dominant tree species”
16. This idea, developed and extended by the embryonic Spanish 
forestry science since the middle of the 19
th century, was founded on the not entirely correct 
assumption that the protective function of a woodland was conditioned by altitude and that it 
was altitude which determined the natural habitat of a tree species
17. Such a disputed 
relationship, which was always present at the forest surveys made in Spain from 1855 on with 
the aim of establishing what woodlands to transfer into private hands and what ones to 
preserve from sale, must be taken into account because it can contribute to explain some of 
the results of my econometric exercises. 
  
                                                 
15 A critical review of the Spanish legislation in the matter of privatisation between 1750 and 1925 can be found 
in Jiménez Blanco (1996) and Linares (2002: 125-249). 
16 Following this criterion, the forest expert initially classified three types of woodlands: to be exempted (fir, 
pine, juniper, lime, beech, chestnut, hazle, birch, alder, holly, common oak, gall oak and viburnum), possibly to 
be alienated (holm oak, cork tree and kermes oak) and woodlands to be privatised (ash, poplar, knotgrass, wild 
olive, terebinth, lentisc, broom, heather, arum, thyme and boxtree). Very soon, however, the budgetary 
necessities of the State substantially curtailed the conservationist tendencies of the first Spanish forest engineers. 
In 1862, the government disposed that only forest estates of more than 100 hectares, populated with pine, 
common oak or beech, would be exempted from sale because of their ecological value. 
17 See Jiménez Blanco (1991: 253-254) and Gómez Mendoza (1992: 26-27).   8
  Since the 1970s, Spanish historiography has tried to study the vast privatisation 
process triggered by the Law of General Disentitlement since 1855, making use of notarial 
registers or official notices of sale. Nevertheless, after many years of intense work in local, 
provincial and national archives, the results of this worthy attempt still leave a lot to be 
desired. We know in full detail how the transferences worked in some Spanish regions during 
certain periods, but we do not have comprehensive figures for the whole country. The absence 
of coordination and, above all, the enormous dispersion of original sources have prevented the 
immense effort of the last decades from being more beneficial
18. 
  In recent times, this discouraging panorama has changed substantially. The renewed 
vitality that Forest History has acquired within Spanish Economic History since the middle of 
the 1980s has positively influenced the studies about the real effects of the Law of General 
Disentitlement
19. The data which the Central Administration collected after 1855, in order to 
discern what lands to sell and what ones to preserve from public auction because of their 
gratuitous use or by virtue of their ecological value, give us a splendid statistical base to 
examine the Spanish privatisation process in aggregate figures. Although the task of 
reconstructing this process on a local scale is still in progress, we already have a first 
provincial quantitative approach thanks to the research published by Grupo de Estudios de 
Historia Rural (GEHR)
20. 
  This first statistical approximation is not free of problems. The original sources of 
GEHR’s estimation are two general catalogues of public woodlands: the first one dating from 
1859 and the second one produced in 1925. The surfaces which were included in them not 
only comprised old communal lands (baldíos and comunes) but also municipal (propios and 
arbitrios), civil (hospitals, schools, etc.) and State woodlands. Although the difference 
between communal and municipal assets is of no great consequence for this present research, 
the historical distinction between these and the remainder generates a small slant in the 
figures which is impossible to resolve for the purposes of my paper. Most of those civil and 
State woodlands were never exploited in common by Spanish rural communities and, 
therefore, their inclusion in the published data by GEHR overvalues somewhat the 
privatisation process that I am going to examine here. Fortunately, the slant is not substantial. 
According to catalogues of public woodlands, the surface occupied by civil and State forests 
in 1859 only represented 7.5 per cent of the total area of public woodlands. The rest of the 
catalogued surfaces all belonged to the villages (propios, arbitrios, comunes and baldíos). 
  As I pointed out before, the difference among these last categories does not pose too 
great a problem for my study. In fact, Spanish historiographical tradition suggests that they all 
derive from a shared root: communal land in the strict sense. The key to the historical 
distinction between them seems to be the greater or lesser control which municipalities 
exercised on them at different times. The word “propios” refers to assets with a limited and 
onerous utilisation which were regularly managed by local corporations to support the 
municipal budget. The term “arbitrios” usually applies to properties of collective and 
                                                 
18 See the historiographical revision of García Pérez (1995). 
19 A critical review of the Spanish Forest History, from the field of Economic History, is found in Jiménez 
Blanco (2002). 
20 In particular, GEHR (1994).   9
gratuitous use which were temporally converted to onerous property so as to cover some 
financial emergency in the local accounts. The word “comunes” is employed to refer to 
possessions which were legally administered by municipalities but which were, in reality, 
assets of free and gratuitous utilisation by all of the neighbours. And, finally, the term 
“baldíos” normally designates grazing areas which were officially recognized as royal 
property but which were traditionally run by local corporations and exploited in common by 
one or more neighbouring communities
21. 
  Despite this apparently clear differentiation, in practice it is very difficult to determine 
the exact status of a particular surface at different moments in time. As A. Nieto remarks, “the 
municipal patrimony, within all its diversity, remained only one (…): what today was 
exploited in common and freedom, tomorrow was rented to neighbours or to strangers (by 
means of a municipal tax) according to the momentary situation of the municipal accounts”
22. 
This is the main reason why the figures that the Spanish catalogues of 1859 and 1925 offer for 
village woodlands do not affect the results of my tests substantially. Moreover, given that the 
greater or lesser dependence on local corporations denotes different levels of evolution 
between common and private property, I think that the use of these statistics contributes to 
improve the view of the Spanish privatisation process with regard to Hardin’s thesis. 
  But the problems of the primary sources do not stop there. As their very names 
indicate, the catalogues of 1859 and 1925 only took into account woodlands (pastures, woods 
and mixed surfaces of pastures, woods and intermittent crops) and not other types of 
communal, municipal, civil or State surfaces (croplands). Even though cultivated estates 
never represented the most important portion of collective assets in Spain as a whole, in many 
parts of the country these properties, above all the municipal ones, were the only remains of 
the old common patrimony by the middle of the 19
th century. It is also important to take this 
aspect into account when considering the general results of my econometric estimations. 
  Likewise, it is necessary to bear in mind that not all of the village woodlands were 
included in the general catalogues of forests. Faced by the threat of public auction, many 
communities attempted and achieved to hide part of their rustic patrimony from the Central 
Administration
23. It is not easy to quantify this practice when the only sources available are 
the surveys of 1859 and 1925. The effort of reconstruction by contrasting numerous sources 
has been completed for Extremadura in my doctoral thesis but is impossible to achieve for all 
Spanish regions at the moment. One can only accept, therefore, the data published by GEHR 
as a first, but very useful, approximation to the privatisation process. 
  On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the chronology of these figures does not 
fully cover the contemporary privatisation of the Spanish collective patrimony. Even leaving 
aside the procedures previous to the middle of the 18
th century, the latest research agrees that 
between 1750 and 1855, above all between 1808 and 1845, the process of privatisation, 
although less furthered by the State than during the period 1855-1925, reached a far from 
                                                 
21 See Nieto (1964), Cuadrado (1980), Mangas (1981) and Sánchez Salazar (1988). 
22 Nieto (1964: 230). 
23  See Jiménez Blanco (1986), Balboa (1990), Manuel (1993), Moreno Fernández (1994), Montiel Molina 
(1995), Iriarte (1997) and Sabio (1997).   10
negligible rhythm in some areas of Spain
24. Furthermore, diverse evidences suggest that the 
period between 1855 (Law of General Disentitlement) and 1859 (First General Catalogue of 
Public Woodlands) was marked by an abundant number of hasty transfers of collective 
property
25, transfers that, regrettably, are not collected in the figures published by GEHR. 
  Finally, before procceding to check Hardin’s theory by using data of privatisation, it 
must be taking into account that the transfer into private hands was not the only form of 
redefinition of the collective rustic patrimony in Spain during the period under investigation. 
The “municipalisation” of old usages in non-privatised lands, the intrusion of State in the 
management of forests which had been exempted from sale or the ploughing of parcels in 
common properties contributed to modify traditional rights of access and use in collective 
assets without producing actual property changes
26. These other forms of redefinition are not 
collected in the figures available for Spain as a whole but they were considered by Hardin 
when he expounded his Neo-Malthusian theory in “The Tragedy of the Commons”. 
  Under such circumstances, then, it might seem surprising to use the data published by 
GEHR with the purpose of checking the historical applicability of Hardin’s thesis. However, 
there are two important arguments in their favour. First, these figures embody, at present, the 
only aggregated statistics for the redefinition process of communal property which took place 
in Spain as a whole since the middle of the 18
th century. Second and more significant, the 
tests run for Extremadura with corrected data for the period 1750-1925 show that, in Neo-
Malthusian terms, the local information available for this region behaves in the same way as 
the statistics published for all of Spain by GEHR. 
 
II.1. The  test 
 
  By using the figures published by GEHR (Table 1), it is very clear that the single legal 
framework (Law of General Disentitlement) did not produce the same effects in all Spanish 
regions
27. Privatisation was especially intense in the South of the country, both in provinces 
where public woodlands were still very important in relative terms in 1859 (Toledo, Cuenca, 
Murcia and Alicante) and in those where such properties were already reduced at the middle 
of the 19
th century (Badajoz, Cáceres, Córdoba, Sevilla, Cádiz and Málaga). In the North, 
however, the figures reveal a clear distinction between Madrid, Ávila, Valladolid, Navarra, 
Zaragoza or Rioja and the remaining areas. In the former provinces, despite preserving a 
notable public patrimony at the end of the period, the property changes were very significant. 
In the rest of the North, privatisation was limited and, in some cases, almost imperceptible.  
 
                                                 
24 See, for example, the works of Sánchez Salazar (1990), Otaegui (1991), Torre (1991), Fuentes Morcillo (1993) 
or Jiménez Blanco (1996) 
25 This is, at least, the conclusion of some authors like Artiaga (1991), Díez Espinosa (1993), Cabral (1995) or 
Jiménez Blanco (1996). 
26 The ploughing of communal lands, for instances, was an extensive practice in Navarra since the sixties of 19
th 
century. See, in this respect, Iriarte (1997). 
27 The catalogues of public woodlands evaluated by GEHR provide data province by province, except for three 
aggregated groups: Baleares, Barcelona and Gerona; Córdoba, Huelva and Sevilla; La Coruña, Lugo, Orense and 
Pontevedra. No data is available for the three provinces of the Basque Country (Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya).    11
 
Table 1 
Privatisation of public woodlands in Spain (1859-1925) 
 
Provinces  a  b  C  d  e  f  g  h  i 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATISATION 




















h / a 
h / d 
 Hectares  Hectares  %  Hectares % Hectares % Hectares  %  % 
                   
Albacete 1,492,400  1,121,420  75.1 318,082  21.3  175,817  11.8 142,265  9.5  44.7 
Alicante 561,700  347,808  61.9  141,667  25.2 64,375  11.5 77,292  13.8  54.6 
Almería 877,500  645,208  73.5 168,393  19.2 94,750  10.8 73,643  8.4  43.7 
Ávila 805,000  481,181  59.8  235,492  29.3  129,091 16.0  106,401 13.2  45.2 
Badajoz 2,176,600  1,655,579  76.1 362,190  16.6 93,827  4.3 268,363  12.3  74.1 
Bal-Bar-Ger (1)  1,863,000  1,063,008  57.1  63,522 3.4  60,260 3.2 3,262  0.2  5.1 
Burgos 1,429,200  942,840  66.0  262,307  18.4 217,480  15.2  44,827  3.1  17.1 
Cáceres 1,986,800  1,679,953  84.6 409,120  20.6  102,628  5.2 306,492  15.4  74.9 
Cádiz 744,000  242,520  32.6  129,533  17.4  41,237 5.5  88,296  11.9  68.2 
Canarias 744,700  471,395  63.3  193,875  26.0 94,290  12.7 99,585  13.4  51.4 
Castellón 663,200  532,401  80.3  67,781  10.2 27,006  4.1 40,775 6.1  60.2 
Ciudad Real  1,981,300  1,391,854 70.2  591,331  29.8  77,467 3.9 513,864  25.9  86.9 
Cór-Hue-Sev (2)  3,793,500  2,285,161  60.2  398,370 10.5  118,709  3.1  279,661  7.4  70.2 
Cor-Lug-Ore-Pon (3)  2,957,500  2,248,929  76.0  528,890 17.9  426,760 14.4 102,130  3.5  19.3 
Cuenca 1,714,000  1,183,394  69.0 439,796  25.7 13,118  0.8 426,678  24.9  97.0 
Granada 1,264,700  863,182  68.3  159,829 12.6  121,675  9.6 38,154  3.0  23.9 
Guadalajara 1,221,400  935,458  76.6 178,423  14.6  147,832  12.1 30,591  2.5  17.1 
Huesca 1,563,600  1,128,548  72.2 288,901  18.5  256,327  16.4 32,574  2.1  11.3 
Jaén 1,349,600  704,514  52.2  401,659 29.8  226,284 16.8 175,375  13.0  43.7 
León 1,558,100  1,030,248  66.1 655,400  42.1  623,285  40.0 32,115  2.1  4.9 
Lérida 1,217,200  836,197  68.7  331,152  27.2 274,303  22.5  56,849  4.7  17.2 
Logroño 504,500  322,950  64.0  189,508  37.6  134,302 26.6  55,206 10.9  29.1 
Madrid 802,800  341,318  42.5  145,583  18.1 56,395  7.0 89,188  11.1  61.3 
Málaga 730,600  334,261  45.8  165,994  22.7  61,698 8.4 104,296  14.3  62.8 
Murcia 1,131,400  661,082  58.4  355,584  31.4 125,324  11.1 230,260 20.4  64.8 
Navarra 1,039,100  755,137  72.7  592,708  57.0 458,230  44.1 134,478 12.9  22.7 
Oviedo 1,060,400  836,744  78.9  408,601  38.5 339,422  32.0  69,179  6.5  16.9 
Palencia 805,200  407,324  50.6  180,409  22.4 165,880  20.6  14,529  1.8  8.1 
Salamanca 1,235,000  769,286  62.3  176,324  14.3 113,531 9.2  62,793  5.1  35.6 
Santander 532,100  368,452  69.2  297,296  55.9 261,399  49.1  35,897  6.7  12.1 
Segovia 692,100  393,524  56.9  124,006  17.9 105,149  15.2  18,857  2.7  15.2 
Soria 1,030,600  676,343  65.6  158,876  15.4 150,794  14.6  8,082  0.8  5.1 
Tarragona 630,300  304,942  48.4  52,160  8.3 49,308  7.8  2,852 0.5  5.5 
Teruel 1,481,000  943,903  63.7  312,523  21.1 282,553  19.1  29,970  2.0  9.6 
Toledo 1,537,000  861,834  56.1  406,036  26.4 74,294  4.8  331,742  21.6  81.7 
Valencia 1,080,600  610,077  56.5  296,159  27.4 251,336  23.3  44,823  4.1  15.1 
Valladolid 811,100  229,386  28.3  135,021  16.6 50,166  6.2 84,855  10.5  62.8 
Zamora 1,056,100  663,026  62.8  98,442  9.3 58,801  5.6 39,641 3.8  40.3 
Zaragoza 1,719,400  1,255,293  72.7 1,046,298 60.9  563,525 32.6 482,773  27.9  46.1 
                    
SPAIN (4)  49,789,311 32,525,680 65.3  11,467,241 23.0  6,838,628 13.7 4,762,481  9.6  41.5 
                  
(1)  Baleares, Barcelona and Gerona 
(2)  Córdoba, Huelva and Sevilla 
(3)  La Coruña, Lugo, Orense and Pontevedra (Galicia) 
(4)  There is no data for the three Basque provinces 
 
SOURCES: GEHR (1994: 140-143).   12
  In a first approximation to regional differences, GEHR focuses on the social features 
of each area and on the diverse historical development which generated them. In contrast to 
the assumptions traditionally adopted by Spanish historiography, this research group rejects as 
determining factors both the physical conditions and the greater or lesser agricultural 
vocation. Thus, for instance, the proportion of geographical surface occupied by all forest area 
of Badajoz and Cáceres in 1860 was very similar to the one detected in Navarra or Zaragoza; 
nevertheless, the percentage of public woodlands in 1859 was very different. Likewise, 
Baleares, Barcelona, Gerona and Tarragona had a total forest surface close to 50 per cent in 
1860 but their public woodlands in 1859 did not reach 8 per cent of their respective provincial 
areas (Table 1: c and e). 
  This first impression, taken from a simple observation of the figures, can be reinforced 
by means of a basic exercise of multiple linear regressions. By using as a dependent variable 
the percentage of public woodlands that were privatised in each Spanish province during the 
period 1859-1925 with regard to the respective surface of public forest in 1859 (Table 1: j), I 
have tried to verify the connection existing between, on the one hand, the privatisation 
process and, on the other hand, the initial agrarian vocation and the physical environment. For 
the initial productive preference (agricultural, livestock or forest), I have employed, as GEHR 
does, the proportion of total forest area in 1860 relating to total geographical surface of each 
province (Table 1: c). For the physical setting, I have composed three distinct indices: 
altitude, humidity, and temperature (Appendix I: A, B and C)
28. 
  The hypothesis to test is based on the supposed agricultural motivation on which 
Spanish historiography has conventionally insisted to explain the privatisation process as a 
whole. According to this hypothetical motivation, it would be logical to think that the greater 
predominance of forest surface at the middle of the 19
th century could reflect a reduced 
historical trend towards the privatisation of communal (public) woodland and, therefore, a 
greater degree of support for the maintenance of collective property since 1855 in reaction to 
the Law of General Disentitlement. From this point of view, the sign of the coefficient 
estimated for the first independent variable (percentage of total forest area in 1860 with regard 
to total geographical surface) should be, evidently, negative. 
  A similar direction should be shown by the second (altitude) and third explicative 
variables (humidity). Taking into account that a greater intensity of these two variables may 
give rise to a more diverse and dense vegetation and, therefore, can contribute to promote the 
multi-faceted use of the forest surface, it is logical to think that such an intensity can also slow 
down the privatisation process as understood by traditional historiography. Besides, the 
preponderance of altitude and the greater vegetation density, in terms of accessibility, may be 
considered as technical obstacles for the cultivation of privatised woodland surfaces
29. 
                                                 
28 To build the altitude index (percentage of surface higher than 1,001 metres over geographical surface of each 
province), I have used the updated figures of INE (2001). For the humidity index, I have calculated the annual 
average of each Spanish province with the local data (precipitations/potential evapo-transpiration) given by Elías 
Castillo and Ruiz Beltrán (1977). With the figures collected by these same authors for the period 1931-1970, I 
have composed the temperature index (provincial annual average in centigrade degrees). 
29 In reality, to test the accessibility by means of a physical variable, it would be more advisable to employ slope 
as a parameter rather than altitude. However, in Spain, this type of data is available only in isolated form.   13
Exercise 1 
Determining Factors for Spanish Privatisation (1859-1925) 
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2  0.32 0.00 0.35 0.30 0.48 0.53 0.46 
F-Statistic 5.46  0.95  7.90 6.56  13.03  11.82 3.1 
White Heteroskedasticity Test  11.97  8.86 6.96 9.02  11.67 12.84 26.52 
         
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Surface of privatised public woodlands (1859-1925) relating to surface public woodlands (1859) (%) 
Number of observations: 39 
(t-statistic) 
Significance Level: 
*  5 % significance level 
**  1 % significance level   14
  Finally, according to conventional interpretation, the fourth variable (temperature) 
should give a positive sign in the proposed regression exercise: in theory, greater temperature 
produces lesser vegetation diversity and density, which in turn discourages multi-faceted use 
and promotes crop cultivation, all of which may support changes to property rights
30. 
  The results of the proposed hypothesis do not leave many doubts (Exercise 1: 1). The 
determination coefficient (Adjusted R
2 = 0.32) is too low to directly relate the Spanish 
privatisation of communal (public) woodland to the natural environment of each area and, 
even less, to provincial agrarian vocation. The signs are, certainly, the expected ones, but the 
significance levels are all irrelevant, except for altitude. In this case, however, it is difficult to 
know if the employed index denotes a real physical factor or works as a proxy of forest 
policy. Bearing in mind that the main criterion for the exception from privatisation of 
“woodlands of public utility” from 1855 was the “dominant tree species” and that altitude was 
the parameter chosen to put into effect such a principle, it would be too simplistic to regard 
altitude as a plain and innocent natural condition. 
  On te other han, it would not be advisable either to overstate the explanatory strength of 
the political variant which underlies altitude and, from that, to consider all of the privatisation 
process to be a merely legal issue. If it were so, this indicator should be able to explain by 
itself the greater part of the property changes which are collected in the dependent variable, 
something that is statistically doubtful in the light of the first regression exercise. In my 
opinion, this test, as a whole, indicates that the initial agrarian preference has no relevance 
and the physical conditions only a limited importance for the comprehension of the marked 
provincial differences in the Spanish privatisation. In this sense, GEHR may be correct when 
it affirms that the intensity of this process was not conditioned by the productive vocation of 
each area or by the natural environment.  
  Without losing sight of this idea, I will proceed to test Hardin’s thesis. With this intent, 
I have prepared a new multiple linear regression by using as independent variables the 
existing data about population and livestock density at the starting point (1859). In first case 
(population density), I have employed the provincial information taken from Spanish 
Population Census of 1860 (Appendix I: D)
31. In the second one (livestock density), I have 
had to utilize the data collected in the Spanish Livestock Census of 1865 (Appendix I: E)
32. 
  As in all livestock surveys carried out in Spain before 1942, the census of 1865, which 
was the first statistical livestock register in the country, took into account young animals aged 
less than one year. This method is disputed for chronological comparative studies as stock 
numbers can change perceptibly depending on the season chosen to produce the survey. For 
the present paper, however, the major impediment to use the 1865 survey is the interval of 
time that passed since the production of the Catalogue of Public Woodlands of 1859. Given 
that the changes in property status of the first years of application of the Law of General 
Disentitlement could have been accompanied by changes in livestock holdings, it is difficult 
                                                 
30 This last hypothesis would be deficient if the regression exercise did not also include other climatic variables 
like humidity. In fact, the optimal method would be to include an aridity index, but, unfortunately no aggregate 
data is available for Spain. 
31 See, on this subject, the old, although still valid, analysis of Melón (1951). 
32 See Cabo Alonso (1960) and GEHR (1985).   15
to establish the trend of the relationship, if indeed it existed, between privatisation and 
livestock density. In any case, as the register of 1865 is the closest to the starting point of the 
studied process, I will assume that this census is a valid indicator to test Hardin’s thesis
33. 
  According to it, the signs expected for the two considered independent variables 
(population density and livestock density) should be positive. The hypothesis to check is that 
there is a linear and direct relationship between pressure on the land and the privatisation 
process; in other words, whether a greater initial population and livestock density could be, by 
itself, a determining factor in the transformation of common (public) property into private 
property. What do Spanish statistics tell us about this subject? 
  Consistent with the result of the new equation (Exercise 1: 2), it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to assert that there is a clear relationship between the process of privatisation and 
demographic or livestock density. What is more, contrary to all expectations, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients are not positive but negative. That is to say that, according to this new 
exercise, if any linear connection existed between density and property changes in Spain, 
which is not easy to believe in the light of the adjusted determination coefficient, it would be 
inverse rather than direct. 
  Although the possibility of this negative association casts doubt on the explanatory 
strength of Hardin’s proposal for the Spanish case, it seems clear that, in order to check the 
validity of the Neo-Malthusian thesis, it is, at least, necessary to introduce an agro-climatic 
variable into the analysis to weight the density with the productive aptitude of each region. By 
doing so, demographic pressure and livestock capacity would probably acquire a greater 
depth of meaning and the supposed relationship between density and privatisation would be 
more representative. In this guise, there is also an approximation to the idea commonly found 
in traditional historiography that, in pre-industrial societies, the density is closely related to 
natural conditions. From this perspective, then, without rejecting Hardin’s theory outright, 
there would be a chance to complement it with some of the available physical indicators. 
  In spite of the fact that this paper is not the most adequate place to re-formulate the 
assumption which underlies “The Tragedy of the Commons” and even though the relationship 
between privatisation and natural environment as such has already been questioned, I have re-
tested this possibility by adding to the terms of the second equation the independent variable 
whose coefficient was significant in the first one: altitude. Likewise, with the aim of checking 
the Neo-Malthusian thesis by means of dynamic parameters rather than by static ones, such as 
the starting density, I have built a new demographic variable: the percentage variation of 
population size in each province between 1787 and 1860
34 (Appendix I: F). The statistical 
effect of this additional parameter in the multiple linear regression is collated in the fourth 
equation. Unfortunately, I have not been able to also include a dynamic variable for livestock 
because, apart from the already mentioned problems that the old Spanish livestock registers 
pose in non cross-section studies, the only information available for the most of the country 
before 1865 was published exclusively at regional and not at provincial level
35. 
                                                 
33 To homogenize the information given by Livestock Census of 1865 (number of heads by species), I have made 
use of the equivalences of live weight for each species as calculated by Flores de Lemus (1951: 156). 
34 The population data of 1787 come from the so-called Census of Floridablanca, published by INE (1981). 
35 See notes 47and 50.   16
  In any case, the improvement of the determination coefficients thanks to the addition 
of the new variables is not significant enough to confirm Hardin’s thesis. The inclusion of 
demographic growth into the analysis (Exercise 1: 4) certainly improves the adjusted R
2 of the 
second equation, but, far from supporting the explicatory capability of the population factor, 
which again shows a negative sign, contributes to increase the significance level of altitude 
itself. However, the combination of density at the starting point and the physical parameters 
(Exercise 1: 3), not only improves the determination coefficient, but also enhances the 
significance level of altitude and demographic pressure. Even so, the R
2 continues to offer a 
relatively low value and, of course, all independent variables persist with negative signs. 
  With the data set employed here, then, the Neo-Malthusian thesis that underlies “The 
Tragedy of the Commons”, still prevailing in many works about disintegration of communal 
systems, has no statistical support. This does not imply that the redefinition of collective 
property in any part of the world has never been related to the demographic or livestock 
pressure on the land. In fact, if livestock density is ruled out, the third equation seems to show 
that, to some extent, there is a relationship, though minor and indirect, between population 
density and the privatisation process. But, how can its unexpected sign be explained? 
  Although it is not easy to answer this question, I would even go so far as to say that 
the incidence of population density in Spain is more related to the historical structure of land 
property and, therefore, to the social and political evolution of each region than to the 
privatisation itself. Moreover, I would argue that what the third equation reflects is, in reality, 
the likely relationship between, on the one hand, the different prevailing systems of access, 
distribution, tenancy and control of the land and, on the other hand, the subsequent 
privatisation process. In this sense, for instance, it would be coherent to think that a 
predominance of large landholdings, together with a rigidity of leasehold arrangements and 
the technical possibility of concentrating several uses within the same exploitation (crops, 
grazing and forestry) could not only embody an obstacle to the growth of population density, 
but also represent the main support of small groups of local power with political capacity to 
promote and control the process of privatisation. In contrast, a preponderance of small 
property, a flexible land market and the chance to supplement household income with the 
gratuitous exploitation of collective rustic patrimony could act, historically speaking, not only 
as an encouragement to demographic expansion, but also as an important stimulus to a 
reduced social differentiation while contributing to the protection of the communal system 
against privatisation. These two examples, however, do not take into account other possibly 
relevant factors such as the different systems of inheritance, the diverse forms of land 
tenancy, the agrarian technology available or the fiscal pressure on rustic property
36. 
                                                 
36 Some instances from Northern Europe question the linear dissolution of communal systems as a consequence 
of population growth. In areas with agricultural vocation and with hereditary partition of land, the demographic 
expansion in the 12
th and 13
th centuries, rather than promoting the disintegration of the commons, encouraged the 
reform of the prevailing systems of exploitation in order to avoid the problems produced by widely dispersed 
family land plots. The total productive surface was then divided into three rotation areas in which every 
household had its own plot. Many communities, above all those with lesser social differentiation and lesser 
manorial fiscal pressure, thus introduced a system of temporal re-distribution of the land which aimed to adapt 
domestic unit resources to changes in family size and, at the same time, to balance income opportunities in order 
to equalize the fiscal capacity of each household. For more details, see Sala (1998: 34-39).   17
  Unfortunately, the explanatory strength of each and every of the variables that shape 
the complex property structure in Spain cannot be statistically checked at moment. Not even 
the degree of predominance of large or small property holdings can be quantified for the 
country as a whole until the 1960s. It was only then that the first rustic property cadastre was 
finally concluded after almost six decades in the making. For previous periods, apart from 
some cadastral advances of the 1930s corresponding to the southern half of Spain, the scarce 
data available on this subject are local or, at best, provincial samples, but never aggregate 
figures for the whole the country. This void prevents me not only from testing the relationship 
between population density and land distribution, but also, and more importantly, from 
checking if the different established property systems can explain the distinct intensity which 
the privatisation process achieved in Spain between 1859 and 1925. 
  Nonetheless, with the purpose of smoothing the way for subsequent investigation, I 
have attempted to superficially test this hypothetical connection by using as an independent 
variable the partial data about small landowners that E. Malefakis (1982: 121-122) took from 
a farming survey of 1956 (Appendix I: G)
37. This addition (Exercise 1: 5) certainly improves 
the adjusted coefficient (R
2 = 0.48). The new variable is significant in the multiple regression 
and the sign of its coefficient is as expected. With this result, it is possible to suppose that the 
lower the proportion of small landowners, the greater the intensity of the privatisation. 
However, such a supposition remains no more than a provisional confirmation of the 
hypothesis put forward. The determination coefficient estimated in the new equation 
continues to be relatively low and the data of 1956 are not accurate enough as well as being 
too far removed in time from the process under investigation. My test only suggests that, in 
order to clarify the historical dissolution of collective property, institutional factors, like the 
prevailing land distribution system, may be much more important than demographic 
variables, such as “The Tragedy of the Commons” understood them. 
  It must be remarked that the sources employed here to reconstruct the process of 
dissolution of collective lands in Spain are not free of problems. The slant in the figures 
generated by the inclusion of civil and State forests, the absence of data concerning privatised 
croplands, the impossibility to discount the practice of concealment and the very chronology 
of the reconstruction are all distorting circumstances which call for prudence. Equally, it must 
be considered that, in the Spanish case, privatisation was not the only form of dissolution of 
the commons. The “municipalisation” of usages, the intrusion of the Central Administration 
in the management of forests which were exempted from public auction or the ploughing of 
lands in common properties contributed to modify traditional rights of access and use in 
collective patrimonies without producing actual property changes per se
38. Given that these 
other forms of redefinition are not collected in my estimations, it would be dishonest to reject 
Hardin’s thesis outright by using data which do not cover all the likely variants of the process 
described by him. 
                                                 
37 The property ranks (1-6), established with the support of such data, have been taken from Sánchez Alonso 
(1995: 300-301). A lower rank means a greater percentage of small landowners with regard to the total working 
agrarian male population. 
38 The ploughing of communal lands, for instances, was an extensive practice in Navarra since the sixties of 19
th 
century. See, in this respect, Iriarte (1997).   18
  Leaving Hardin aside, I have tried to check one of the most suggestive proposal 
concerning the possible determining factors of the crisis of the commons: the one put forward 
by R.B. Noorgard. Although this author, too, insists on the size of the community as an aspect 
to be considered in order to explain the redefinition of collective property in pre-industrial 
societies, the basis of his thesis is not demographic density as such, but the capacity of 
negotiation of the users of the commons. Noorgard’s initial proposal, which is taken from 
New Institutional Economy, maintains that the rise of the number of users in small rural 
communities can impede (or render more expensive) the consensus among them and, 
therefore, interfere with the defence of the communal system. Consequently, his focus is not 
so much placed on the changes in demographic density themselves, but rather on the change 
of scale of the scenario where decisions are usually taken. According to Noorgard’s 
conclusions, this modification of scale becomes more dangerous to the continuity of 
collective property as the distance between the place of communal production and the points 
of consumption decreases
39. 
  This last proposal, directly connected to the changes in market size, is the most 
valuable for the intentions of this paper because it is the only one that can be checked with the 
data available for Spain. In this sense, even though the main explanatory factor in Noorgard’s 
thesis is the distance between the rural and the urban world, something which is difficult to 
measure at provincial level, it appears reasonable to make use of an urbanisation rate and an 
index of the geographical distribution of population as proxies for this factor. 
  In the first case (urbanisation rate), it would seem advisable to employ the Spanish 
Population Census of 1887 which collected data by settlements. However, given that there are 
almost thirty years of difference between this census and the production of the first public 
woodlands survey, I prefer to use the figures of the Census of 1860
40. The main problem that 
this survey poses is that it does not compute the population by settlements but by municipal 
districts. This can give rise to an overvaluation of the urbanisation rate in those areas where 
the dispersion of the population is a predominant feature. In spite of this, the proximity to the 
starting point of the process under analysis recommends the use of the urbanisation 
coefficients taken from the data of 1860 (Appendix I: H)
41. 
  For the geographical distribution of population, I have divided the total surface of each 
province by the number of settlements in the province as defined by the Spanish Nomenclator 
of 1900 (Appendix I: I). The purpose of this simple index is to have a measure for the type of 
habitat (scattered or concentrated) prevalent in the different regions of Spain. Evidently, the 
form of human establishment is not a measure for the distance between rural and urban world, 
but, in pre-industrial societies, can work out as a good indicator of the degree of exposure to 
market forces. In this way, it seems logical to think that a dispersed community is less open to 
the market than a concentrated one and therefore, according to Noorgard’s proposal, more 
inclined to preserve common property. From this point of view, the expected sign for the my 
index of geographical distribution of population would clearly be positive. 
                                                 
39 See Noorgard (1995). 
40 Both the urbanisation rates of 1860 and 1887 have been calculated and published by Luna (1988: 62-65). 
41 However, I have also tested the explanatory capacity of the 1887 census rates and the difference with regard to 
the data of 1860 is not significant for the purposes of this paper.   19
  In addition to this index, I have decided to incorporate into the new estimation another 
independent variable: the proportion of industrial workforce with regard to the total 
population of 1860 (Appendix I: J). The idea behind this inclusion is that the industrial 
population rate can be a relatively valid indicator for the degree of economic development 
and, at the same time, in keeping with Noorgard’s theory, a possible proxy for market size. 
Obviously, this rate, as occurs with all working population coefficients derived from 
nineteenth-century Spanish censi, poses serious problems when it is employed as an authentic 
index of provincial economic development, but much less so when used as an approximate 
indicator of market maturity. For my purposes, it is only applied as a complement to the 
urbanisation rate and the population geographical distribution index. In this configuration, the 
expected sign for the industrial workforce coefficient, like for the urban variable and the 
indicator of habitat, would evidently be positive: the greater the proportion of industrial 
population, the greater the market development and, therefore, the greater the encouragement 
to convert common (public) property into private property. 
  The result of the econometric test (Exercise 1: 6) leaves much to be desired regarding 
this last aspect. The sign of the coefficient for the third variable is not the expected one and its 
significance level is null. It is therefore clear that, at least for Spain, the relative weight of the 
industrial working population does not play a role when the main object is to try to understand 
the determining factors of the privatisation process.  
  The greater or lesser level of urbanisation does not seem to have a substantial 
influence on this process either. In the new estimation, the significance level of the urban 
variable is also null. Besides and contrary to expectation, the sign of its coefficient is 
negative. In the light of such results it is difficult to accept that the different degree of 
urbanisation could determine the different degree of development with was achieved in Spain 
by the privatisation of communal lands between 1859 and 1925. 
  Nevertheless, as a result of the new estimation, Noorgard’s thesis cannot be excluded. 
In fact, the significance level shown by the index of geographical distribution of population 
and the improvement that the determination coefficient experiences before its inclusion 
(Adjusted R
2 = 0.53) with regard to the econometric check of Hardin’s theory (Exercise 1: 2) 
seem to indicate that, even though property right changes are related to factors of much 
greater complexity than have been analysed here, a greater exposure to the market, via 
concentration of population, could contribute to the dissolution of collective patrimony.  
  But the distribution of population is not only an indicator of the degree of exposure to 
the market forces. The greater or lesser dispersion of population could be also considered as a 
sign of the level of social differentiation in the rural world: it seems coherent to suppose that 
scattered communities are more internally balanced in terms of economic power or capacity 
for political decision than concentrated ones. In this sense and in view of the new estimation, I 
agree with Noorgard when he points out isolation as an important encouragement for the 
social consensus that, in many ways, is necessary for the survival of collective property. 
However, the determination coefficient given by the sixth equation, though even it is clearly 
the highest of the present exercise, is not significant enough to emphatically affirm that the 
form of human establishment is a totally decisive factor in the privatisation process which 
took place in Spain after the Law of General Disentitlement.    20
  This, then, is the final conclusion of my first exercise. None of the variables checked 
here demonstrates sufficient weight to establish a global explanatory model of the Spanish 
privatisation process. From my point of view, this already says much. On the one hand, given 
the results of my estimations, it seems difficult to continue maintaining Hardin’s demographic 
thesis, either implicitly or explicitly, without serious reservations. The greater intensity of the 
privatisation, at least in Spain during the period 1859-1925, bears no relationship to greater 
livestock or population density. If any connection is to be construed, then the relationship 
would be inverse, but in no case direct. On the other hand, but closely linked to this last point, 
the first regression exercise demonstrates that the factors that could really explain the 
diversity of the privatisation process in the Spanish case may underlie or affect the factors 
examined, but they have not all been tested here. In this sense, the institutional and social 
aspects (forest policy, land sharing, property distribution, tenancy models, inheritance 
systems, fiscal pressure, capacity of political negotiation or social differentiation among 
others) are destined to be factors of greater weight in a consistent clarification of the crisis of 
the communal system. In addition to them, my exercise suggests that there are external 
factors, such as the urbanisation process or the irruption of the market in the rural world, 
which could complement the general explanation but cannot, by themselves, account for the 




III.  The redefinition of collective property in Extremadura (1750-1925) 
 
  Extremadura (Badajoz and Cáceres) was one of the Spanish regions most affected by 
the consequences of the Law of General Disentitlement in relative terms (Table 1: j). 
However, as the proportion of public woodlands of 1859 relating to the geographical surface 
suggests (Table 1: e), the dissolution of communal lands in the region was already much 
advanced by the middle of the 19
th century. In effect, my doctoral thesis reveals that, between 
1750 and 1855, the privatisation of the forest spaces traditionally assigned to collective use 
(pastures, woods and mixed surfaces of pastures, woods and intermittent crops), without 
reaching the impetus of the subsequent process, was indeed considerable. Almost 30 per cent 
of total communal and municipal woodland surface transferred to private hands between 1750 
and 1925 was privatised during the phase 1750-1855 (Table 2: k). This notable proportion, 
estimated by employing different sources to which I briefly refer below, permits to test 
Hardin’s thesis, not only within a broader timeframe, but also in a context in which State 
intervention was less decisive with reference to the privatisation model itself
43. 
                                                 
42 It must be considered that the process of integration of a national market in Spain, above all with regard to 
agrarian products, began to be a visible reality since the middle of the 19
th century, coinciding with the 
appearance of the first railways. Unfortunately, the provincial data available on this subject are not 
comprehensive enough to incorporate them into a multiple linear regression exercise. However, for the future, in 
order to test the real applicability of Noorgard’s thesis concerning the distance between the place of communal 
production and the points of consumption, it would be desirable to obtain some type of measure for this process 
of integration. In this manner, perhaps market forces would become more representative statistically speaking. 
43 For an approach to this context, see, among others, Sánchez Salazar (1990), Otaegui (1991), Torre (1991), 
Fuentes Morcillo (1993), Jiménez Blanco (1996) and Linares (2002).   21
  Even though the Spanish Monarchy provided Extremadura with flexible legal 
instruments regarding the redefinition of collective property in the second half of the 18
th 
century and although the nascent liberal State authorized the sale of part of the old communal 
patrimony at different moments of the first half of the 19
th century, the privatisation process 
previous to 1855 was basically defined by local requirements and by the absence of specific 
rules about how and what to privatise. So much so that during the period in which the legal 
framework gave the rural community a greater facility to access to the full property of 
communal lands (1834-1840), the transfers in the region were less important in absolute terms 
than in those other stages during which State imposed more restrictive norms (1840-1845) or 
in which the State was not even present (1808-1814). Besides, in contrast to what occurred 
after 1855, participation in this non-regulated process was limited almost exclusively to the 
inhabitants of the townships where the lands to be privatised were located. The change in 
property status was not generally preceded by public auctions, but by municipal adjudications 
or, at best, local distributions in which eligibility was determined by residence in the very 
neighbourhood. This does not imply, in any way, that the privatisation process in 
Extremadura between 1750 and 1855 was a socially balanced process. In truth, as was to 
happen later also, local power groups (large property owners with influence in the municipal 
corporations) were to reap the greatest benefit from the whole procedure
44. 
  In the present paper, my interest in such a process is not related to the social 
differences it could promote but, in keeping to the objectives set out, to the different factors 
which can explain it. To be exact, the main interest centres on the possibility of testing them 
by using privatisation data that are much more suited to the purpose of this work (collective 
patrimony and not public property) and which cover a more extensive period of time. As with 
the figures for Spain as a whole, the point of departure for these data is the forest information 
collected by the Central Administration starting 1859 to determine the public surfaces to be 
sold. This general information, contrasted and corrected with sources of local character, has 
been examined woodland by woodland and projected backwards by employing as references 
various surveys carried out by the State in Extremadura around the middle of the 19
th century 
as well as the information which the Monarchy gathered from the villages of the region 
between 1750 and 1755 to create the so-called Catastro del Marqués de la Ensenada
45. 
  The result of such evaluation is a rigorous local assessment of all of the communal and 
municipal forest surfaces that were transferred to private hands in Extremadura from the 
middle of the 18
th century until 1925. This estimation possesses some additional advantages 
over the data published for Spain as a whole: while excluding civil and State properties, it 
includes sales of the confused period 1855-1859 and corrects to a great extent the error 
contained in the overall Spanish figures due to the concealment practised by towns to avoid 
the action of the Law of General Disentitlement. Besides, given that in Extremadura the 
redefinition of common property preponderantly took the form of privatisation, the statistical 
reconstruction of this process smoothes the distorting effect of those other forms of 
dissolution of collective patrimony which cannot be quantified for the Spanish case. 
                                                 
44 See Linares (2002: 286-378). 
45 The reconstruction method is exhaustively explained in Linares (2002: 251-285).   22
Table 2 
Privatisation of communal and municipal woodlands in Extremadura (1750-1925) 
 
Judicial Districts  a  b  c  d  e  f  g 
Dependent Variables 
Percentages of Privatisation 
k  l 
  b - c  c - d  b - d  h  i  j  e / g  f / g 












































































































































 Hectares  Hectares  Hectares  Hectares  Hectares  Hectares  Hectares  % % % %  % 
                   
Alburquerque 130,027  62,288  46,592  42,776 15,696  3,816 19,512  25.2 8.2  31.3  80.4  19.6 
Almendralejo  147,571 36,445 23,453  79 12,992 23,374  36,366 35.6 99.7 99.8  35.7  64.3 
Badajoz  161,863 81,884 12,392  96 69,492 12,296  81,788 84.9 99.2 99.9  85.0  15.0 
Castuera 211,112  59,208  24,936  1,714 34,272 23,222 57,494  57.9 93.1 97.1  59.6  40.4 
Don Benito  108,725  38,442  29,899  906  8,543  28,993  37,536 22.2 97.0 97.6  22.8  77.2 
Fregenal  91,582 20,239 16,219  175  4,020 16,044  20,064 19.9 98.9 99.1  20.0  80.0 
Fuente de Cantos  143,137  53,736  41,050  916  12,686 40,134 52,820  23.6  97.8 98.3  24.0  76.0 
Herrera del Duque  192,185  94,959  94,218  41,861  741 52,357 53,098  0.8  55.6 55.9  1.4  98.6 
Jerez    130,159 27,816 15,987  3,379 11,829 12,608  24,437 42.5 78.9 87.9  48.4  51.6 
Llerena  237,264  65,169  56,363 5,823 8,806  50,540  59,346 13.5 89.7 91.1  14.8  85.2 
Mérida 189,524  53,422  33,385  1,492 20,037 31,893 51,930  37.5  95.5 97.2  38.6  61.4 
Olivenza  143,055 60,838 52,133  512  8,705 51,621  60,326 14.3 99.0 99.2  14.4  85.6 
Puebla de Alcocer  144,343  30,405  25,239  2,361  5,166 22,878 28,044  17.0  90.6 92.2  18.4  81.6 
Villanueva  73,573  14,344  12,076 1,486 2,268  10,590  12,858 15.8 87.7 89.6  17.6  82.4 
Zafra  73,109 21,221 11,825  645  9,396 11,180  20,576 44.3 94.5 97.0  45.7  54.3 
BADAJOZ (Prov.)  2,177,229  720,416  495,767 104,221 224,649 391,546 616,195  31.2 79.0 85.5  36.5  63.5 
                   
Alcántara 137,591  30,269  23,404  3,966 6,865  19,438  26,303  22.7 83.1 86.9  26.1  73.9 
Cáceres  223,481  50,709  44,115 4,202 6,594  39,913  46,507 13.0 90.5 91.7  14.2  85.8 
Coria  106,542 41,605 29,695  7,276 11,910 22,419  34,329 28.6 75.5 82.5  34.7  65.3 
Garrovillas  124,861  45,689  37,934 9,872 7,755  28,062  35,817 17.0 74.0 78.4  21.7  78.3 
Hervás  137,765 63,939 63,042 45,105  897 17,937  18,834  1.4 28.5 29.5  4.8  95.2 
Hoyos  106,664 44,907 16,770  7,143 28,137  9,627  37,764 62.7 57.4 84.1  74.5  25.5 
Jarandilla  89,390 59,869 49,536 25,101 10,333 24,435  34,768 17.3 49.3 58.1  29.7  70.3 
Logrosán  241,534  133,056  106,005  9,368 27,051 96,637  123,688 20.3 91.2 93.0  21.9  78.1 
Montánchez 72,256  54,041  49,701  4,538 4,340  45,163  49,503  8.0 90.9 91.6  8.8  91.2 
Navalmoral  227,750 83,984 72,598  8,948 11,386 63,650 75,036  13.6  87.7 89.3  15.2  84.8 
Plasencia 188,319  60,132  38,188  15,240 21,944 22,948 44,892  36.5 60.1 74.7  48.9  51.1 
Trujillo  199,974  136,071  128,142 5,734 7,929  122,408  130,337  5.8 95.5 95.8  6.1  93.9 
Valencia de A.  123,868  30,754  19,414  1,807  11,340 17,607 28,947  36.9  90.7 94.1  39.2  60.8 
CÁCERES (Prov.)  1,979,995  835,025  678,544 148,300 156,481 530,244 686,725  18.7 78.1 82.2  22.8  77.2 
                   
EXTREMADURA 4,157,224  1,555,441  1,174,311 252,521 381,130 921,790 1,302,920 24.5 78.5 83.8  29.3  70.7 
                   
 
SOURCES: Linares (2002: 287-293).   23
  This local reconstruction, grouped for the present paper by judicial districts
46, 
constitutes the statistical base for the three dependent variables of my next multiple linear 
regressions. The first one involves the percentage of privatised communal and municipal 
woodlands between 1750 and 1925 with regard to total communal and municipal forest 
surface of 1750 (Table 2: h). The second one consists of the proportion of privatised 
communal and municipal woodlands between 1750 and 1855 compared to the total existing 
communal and municipal surface in 1750 (Table 2: i). The third one contains the percentage 
of privatised communal and municipal woodlands between 1855 and 1925 over the total 
communal and municipal forest surface of 1855 (Table 2: j). The object of this triple division 
is not only to find out if Hardin’s thesis can make sense in the long term or at a local level, but 
also to discover if its greater or lesser applicability could be related to the greater or lesser 
extent of State intervention in the privatisation process. 
  Concerning the complementary information that is required to check this procedure in 
Extremadura, the data available are somewhat less varied than for Spain as a whole. In this 
case, it is impossible to make use of consistent local statistics related to the agrarian vocation 
or to the land property structure. In compensation, the Catastro del Marqués de la Ensenada 
collected a generous amount of local information about population, livestock, urbanisation 
and working population for the middle of the 18
th century. Thanks to such records, I have 
been able to construct, at district level, four different variables for the middle of the 18
th 
century: population density, livestock density, urbanisation rate and industrial working 
population coefficient (Appendix II: E, F, G, and H)
47. 
  Together with these indicators, I have also prepared four independent variables for the 
moment in which the Law of General Disentitlement decreed the property transfers: 
population density, livestock density, urbanisation rate and industrial working population 
coefficient (Appendix II: I, J, K, and L)
48. Finally, according to peculiarities introduced by 
certain physical variables and by the type of human habitat in the first regression exercise, I 
have endeavoured to assemble three indicators of altitude, humidity and temperature and an 
index for the geographical distribution of population (Appendix II: A, B, C and D)
49  
                                                 
46 This is the only supra-local unit for which some official surveys of the 19
th century collected information 
about population, livestock or working population. 
47  These data are not statistical figures in the strict sense but quantitative approximations based on local 
enquiries. However, their validity for regional studies has been recognised in multiple occasions by Spanish 
historiography. It must be noted that, while population, livestock and urbanisation data were directly collected by 
me for my doctoral thesis, the figures of industrial workforce have been taken from the local reconstruction of 
Melón Jiménez (1996: 83-91) by using the records contained in the Mapas or Estados Generales del Catastro 
del Marqués de la Ensenada. 
48 To construct the urbanisation rates in the case of Extremadura, I have made use of more flexible criteria than 
those employed for Spain as a whole (municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants) in order to achieve a 
minimum degree of representation in all of the districts that compose the region. The measure selected for the 
middle of the 18
th century is a population over 2,000 inhabitants; while for middle of 19
th century, municipalities 
with more than 2,500 inhabitants are selected. 
49 In this case, the altitude indicator has not been built in the same manner as for the Spanish index. At district 
level, the only information available on this subject in Extremadura is the average altitude over the sea level. 
This information is very different to the used one for Spain and can change, in one way or another, the relative 
importance which that variable delivered in the Spanish estimations (Exercise 1).   24
  Based on these variables and following the criteria used in the first estimation, I have 
carried out three econometric exercises (Exercises 2.a., 2.b. and 2.c.), one for each of the 
phases into which the privatisation process has been divided in order to examine the case of 
Extremadura (1750-1925, 1750-1855 and 1855-1925). In the third one (1855-1925), I have 
also included as independent variables three additional indicators: the population growth 
between 1750 and 1860, the livestock increase during the period 1750-1865 and the 
percentage of privatised communal and municipal forest surface between 1750 and 1855 with 
regard to communal and municipal woodlands in 1750.  
  As in the Spanish case, the two first variables (Appendix II: M and N) have the aim of 
testing the Neo-Malthusian theory not by means of static parameters, such as the starting 
density, but by dynamic ones
50. For the third variable (Table 2: h) the objective is entirely 
different. The main purpose of its inclusion is to know if the privatisation process which took 
place in Extremadura after the Law of General Disentitlement could have been determined by 
the very property changes of the stage previous to 1855. According to the authors who 
consider Spanish privatisation a mere result of State intervention, the hypothetical relationship 
between both processes should be negative. If the sign of such a link in my estimations were 
the expected one, it would be coherent to agree with these authors that State action was 
crucial: in areas where transfers were scarce during the stage 1750-1855, the Law of General 
Disentitlement would promote the privatisation process from 1855 on, while in districts where 
property changes were significant between 1750 and 1855, this act would have a reduced 
effect because the most valuable part of the municipal forest patrimony had already been 
disposed of before 1855. Let us see what the coefficients say. 
  The first and the most important conclusion arising from the estimated coefficients in 
Exercise 2 with regard to the main objective of this paper is that, when using data on a smaller 
scale, Hardin’s Neo-Malthusian thesis is not statistically borne out in the long term either. Not 
even by applying dynamic variables or by combining the static ones with physical parameters, 
can the population pressure or the livestock capacity in Extremadura achieve acceptable levels 
of significance to permit their consideration as possible explanatory factors of the process of 
privatisation before or after the Law of General Disentitlement. Statistically speaking, no 
relationship exists between the demographic or livestock growth and the redefinition of 
communal and municipal property in the region from the middle of the 18
th century until 
1925. Hardin was, therefore, not only wrong when he identified common property with no 
property (“open to all”), but also when he went on to assert that the “tragedy of the commons” 
was directly and inexorably related to population or livestock pressure over the land
51. 
                                                 
50 Although, as I pointed out in the second part of this paper, the livestock registers in Spain pose serious 
problems in non cross-section studies, the contrast between the data of 1750 and the figures of 1865 has already 
been satisfactorily tested, at a regional scale, by García Sanz (1994). 
51  The only peculiarity worth mentioning for Exercise 2 when compared to Exercise 1 is the sign of the 
coefficients related to population and livestock in the three new estimations. In contrast with Spain as a whole, 
population density or demographic growth generally present positive signs in the case of Extremadura. The 
livestock coefficients, however, do not offer too much regularity. For the period 1750-1855, livestock density 
presents signs opposite to the phases 1750-1925 and 1855-1925 but similar to the ones which livestock growth 
offers for this last phase. While I have no consistent explanation for such changes, the statistical significance of 
these indicators in all the estimations is nil.    25
Exercise 2.a. 
Determining factors for the privatisation process in Extremadura (1750-1925) 
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Population Distribution (1900) 
(Hectare / Settlement) 





Urbanisation Rate (1750) 
(%) 





Industrial Working Population 
(1750) (%) 






2  0.22 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.16 
F-Statistic  3.68 1.38 3.46 2.43 1.68 
White Heteroskedasticity Test  4.73  2.72  4.51  23.04  12.76 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Surface of privatised communal and municipal woodlands (1750-1925) relating to surface communal 
and municipal woodlands (1750)  




*   5 % significance level 
**  1 % significance level   26
Exercise 2.b. 
Determining factors for the privatisation process in Extremadura (1750-1855) 
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2  0.03 0.02 0.17 0.27 
F-Statistic  1.30 0.38 2.94 2.25 
White Heteroskedasticity Test  7.34  0.99  4.78  16.58 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Surface of communal and municipal woodlands privatised (1750-1855) relating to surface communal 
and municipal woodlands (1750)  




*  5 % significance level 
**  1 % significance level   27
Exercise 2.c. 
Determining factors for the privatisation process in Extremadura (1855-1925) 
 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 






































































































and Municipal W. Surf. 
(1750-1855) (%) 










(Hectare / Settlement) 

















Pop. (1860) (%) 








2  0.28 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.21 
F-Statistic  4.65 1.55 1.44 4.39 4.03 6.38 3.00 1.69 1.80 
W. Heteroskedasticity 
Test 
3.69 1.89 3.32 3.62 4.73 1.67  15.62  15.43  16.45 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Surface of communal and municipal woodlands privatised (1855-1925) relating to communal and 
municipal woodland surface (1855) 





*  5 % significance level 
**  1 % significance level   28
  On the other hand, leaving aside the Neo-Malthusian principles once and for all, my 
second exercise, too, reveals that the physical conditions have a much slighter impact in the 
districts than at provincial level. This affirmation, based on the determination coefficients of 
the three new estimations (never higher than 0.28) and perfectly comprehensible given the 
greater environmental homogeneity that exists among neighbouring areas, is accompanied, in 
the case of Extremadura, by an important difference with regard to the natural variables that 
appear to influence the Spanish privatisation. In Extremadura, humidity and not altitude is the 
only physical factor to acquire statistical relevance, at least in the second phase of the process 
of redefinition (1855-1925) and, by extension, taking into account the greater relative weight 
of this stage within the process of privatisation as a whole, during the period 1750-1925.  
  As in Spain, however, the importance of humidity in Extremadura also seems to hide 
behind a political variant: the legal exemption of public woodlands populated by selected tree 
species since the Law of General Disentitlement. If this were not so, it would be difficult to 
understand why this variable is not statistically significant between 1750 and 1855. From my 
point of view, humidity only achieves relevance in the phase 1855-1925 because its positive 
impact on the vegetation permitted to preserve part of the communal and municipal patrimony 
from auction. In this sense, State intervention (forest policy), rather than forcing the property 
changes, could be hindering indiscriminate privatisation. 
  In any case, the trends for this issue seem to have been already internally established 
in Extremadura before the Law of General Disentitlement. This is, at least, the impression that 
I gain from the coefficients which the percentage of privatised communal and municipal 
surface between 1750 and 1855 gives in the third estimation (Exercise 2.c.). Even though 
these coefficients are not significant, their positive sign invites to think that the process of 
privatisation of the old collective property since 1855 followed the same path as the preceding 
one: wherever the redefinition was important before the Law of General Disentitlement, it 
continued to be important after 1855. From this perspective and without forgetting, of course, 
the total absence of linear relationship among the data available in Extremadura to measure 
the relative incidence from one process and another, it would be recommendable not to 
overvalue the capacity of the Spanish State to impose, by decree, the dissolution of the 
collective system. Ultimately, the greater or lesser intensity of property transfers depended on 
multiple and, sometimes, hardly measurable local factors that the Law of General 
Disentitlement could stimulate in one way or another but not generate by itself.  
  Finally, taking up again the theses of Noorgard, it is necessary to refer to the almost 
imperceptible incidence of the urbanisation rates and the industrial workforce coefficients on 
the process of privatisation in Extremadura between 1750 and 1925. I suspect, nonetheless, 
that the statistical lack of meaning of these variables, above all of the urbanisation rates, is 
closely related to the uncertain value of the criteria that I have employed to construct them: 
municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants in 1750 and municipalities with more than 
2,500 inhabitants in 1860. The use of these criteria in Extremadura was dictated by the need 
to achieve a minimum level of representation in each and every of the districts that comprise 
the region. Their application, however, undervalues, in relative terms, the importance of the 
towns located in the Southern province of Badajoz and overvalues the magnitude of the few 
urban centres in the Northern province of Cáceres.   29
  These demographic concentrations should, in no case, be considered as focuses for the 
surrounding countryside, as the limited industrial working population rates demonstrate when 
compared to other Spanish provinces (Appendix I: J). In reality, the main destinations for the 
agrarian surplus were historically situated outside of the region, in Madrid and Sevilla. So, in 
order to test Noorgard’s suggestive proposal more precisely, it would be desirable to employ a 
refined measure of the physical distance between such urban concentrations and each of the 
districts of Extremadura, a task which has been quite impossible to complete for this paper but 
which I do not rule out for future research
52. 
  Equally, the construction of an index of geographical distribution of population for the 
region has not given the expected result either. Whereas in Spain as a whole the forms of 
habitat demonstrated to have a certain relevance in order to explain the privatisation process 
occurred after 1855, in Extremadura the impact of this factor only seems to have been 
relatively significant during the stage 1750-1855. Moreover, in contrast with the Spanish case, 
the sign of the coefficients estimated for the populating index of Extremadura for 1855-1925 
and, by extension, in the period 1750-1925 is not positive but negative. I have no consistent 
explanation for these differences, much less so when the form of habitat is used as a possible 
proxy for social differentiation. I think, however, that the changing performance of this 
variable in the case of Extremadura could be related to the dissimilarities in the models of 
privatisation which were developed in the region before and after 1855.  
  As I pointed out above, the participation in the privatisation previous to the Law of 
General Disentitlement was basically limited to the inhabitants of the townships where the 
lands to be privatised were located. This would explain the level of significance and the sign 
(positive) of the coefficients given by the population distribution index for 1750-1855: in a 
process of local character, the isolation could have worked as an encouragement for the social 
consensus and for the survival of collective property. On the contrary, the privatisation 
subsequent to the Law of General Disentitlement was defined in Extremadura not only by 
public auction, but also by the marked participation of outsiders to the region, specially the 
flourishing bourgeoisie of the country’s capital
53. Under such circumstances, it is possible to 
think that, after 1855, the greater or lesser concentration of the population and, by extension, 
the greater or lesser social differentiation at local level became irrelevant variables in the 
privatisation process. 
  As to the rest, the new estimations completely confirm the general conclusions already 
indicated in the second part of the present paper. By employing the available data, it is not 
possible to create an econometric model to explain the property changes in the collective 
patrimony in Extremadura since the middle of the 18
th century. In fact, as the adjusted 
determination coefficients show, no linear relationship exists between the privatisation 
occurred in the region and the different parameters which have been checked here as 
independent variables. These indicators can only elucidate, by exclusion, a small part of the 
vast process of privatisation which took place in Extremadura during the period 1750-1925 
(above all the inapplicability of the Hardin’s thesis), but cannot explain it by themselves.  
                                                 
52 See note 42. 
53 See, on this subject, García Pérez (1994).   30
  Again, the shadow of the missing pieces hangs over the checked samples and casts 
doubt on the possibility of testing with measurable data the complexity of a process in which 
multiple factors seem to have intervened. Additionally, a comprehensive explanation calls for 
social and political variables among the rest of the possible justifications. It is precisely here 
where traditional historiography, New Institutional Economy and the more recent eco-social 
history have more to say. Only they and not the Neo-Malthusian assumptions put forward by 
Hardin in “The Tragedy of the Commons” will advance the knowledge of the historical 





  In spite of the justified disapproval which Hardin’s theory has received from criticism 
regarding the freedom of use that this author attributed to collective lands, the Neo-
Malthusian thesis which is behind “The Tragedy of the Commons” has not only been usually 
adopted by the critics but indeed continues to persist in the works that, from the field of 
Economic and Social History, try to comprehend the reasons for the decline of traditional 
collective systems. In essence, this thesis, sometimes used almost involuntarily, is very 
simple: as soon as the level of balance between population and livestock density and natural 
resources is surpassed, the tendency to redefine common property inevitably emerges in one 
way or another. Perhaps the base of its widespread popularity precisely lies in its great 
simplicity. 
  The main objective of my paper has just been to check the demographic assumption of 
Hardin, with the help of econometrics, by employing the empirical evidence available for 
Spain in general and for Extremadura in particular with reference to the privatisation process 
which took place in the country from the middle of the 18
th century until 1925. And the results 
of my estimations (multiple linear regressions) do not leave many doubts about the limited 
functionality of the Neo-Malthusian principles developed in “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
when employed to explain property changes in the rural world. 
  In the Spanish case, the estimations made by using the data available for the period 
1859-1925, published by GEHR and concerning the privatisation process which the public 
woodlands suffered as a consequence of the Law of General Disentitlement of 1855, reveal 
that the provincial differences in this process were not determined by the starting population 
or livestock density. Moreover, contrary to what Hardin maintained, the limited statistical 
relationship existing between the demographic variables and the property changes occurred in 
Spain since the middle of the 19
th century does not seem to have been positive but negative: 
the greater the population and livestock density, the lesser the degree of privatisation. This 
unexpected direction and its scarce statistical importance, reaffirmed even by weighting the 
effects of the demographic variables with environmental indicators, minimize the capability 
of the Neo-Malthusian thesis to explain the dissolution of the old communal patrimony.  
  With the figures used for Spain as a whole, however, some further precision is 
required. On the one hand, it is convenient not to forget that the data employed here not only 
include communal lands, but also municipal, civil and State properties. On the other hand, it   31
is necessary to take into account that the major State intervention in the process which these 
figures cover can slant the explanatory potentiality of the econometric estimations to a certain 
extent. Finally, it must be remembered that privatisation was not the only form of dissolution 
of the common system in the Spanish case. Other forms of individualisation contributed to 
modify traditional rights of access and use to collective rustic patrimony without producing 
property changes. 
  The data available for Extremadura, which only cover the communal and municipal 
woodlands in the period comprised between 1750 and 1925, permit to correct the defects of 
the Spanish figures in order to test Hardin’s Neo-Malthusian theory more accurately. But, 
even reducing the political slant which the Law of General Disentitlement may have 
introduced in the privatisation process and smoothing the distorting effect of those other 
forms of dissolution of collective rustic patrimony, the econometric estimations continue to 
discredit the applicability of “The Tragedy of the Commons”. In fact, while for Spain as a 
whole the coefficients given by demographic pressure, though negative, seem to be at least 
significant, for Extremadura the relationship between the privatisation process and population 
or livestock variables is statistically non-existent. In no case, therefore, can the Neo-
Malthusian postulations employed by Hardin to explain the disintegration of collective 
property be used by themselves to attempt to understand the real reasons for the privatisation 
of the communal lands in Spain since the middle of the 18
th century. 
  Beyond Hardin’s thesis, the natural conditions do not seem to be determining factors 
either for the comprehension of the property changes occurring in the country between 1750 
and 1925. It is certain that altitude could be a statistically valuable variable in the privatisation 
subsequent to the Law of General Disentitlement. The problem is that, as altitude was used by 
the State forest policy as a reference to decide what woodlands to sell and what woodlands to 
preserve, it is difficult to know if the action of this variable at provincial level had a merely 
political component or, in truth, was a physical action. In this sense, the coefficients obtained 
for the different phases into which the privatisation process has been divided to test the case 
of Extremadura reveal that the environmental settings, this time humidity but not altitude, 
only had certain significance after 1855. From this perspective, the political facet of natural 
conditions seems to gain importance at the expense of their physical import, even though, 
statistically speaking, such variables cannot explain by themselves the property changes 
occurred in Spain neither before the Law of General Disentitlement nor after 1855. 
  A similar conclusion is drawn from the econometric exercises carried out to test 
Noorgard’s theories. Neither the urbanisation rates nor the percentages of industrial working 
population show statistical relevance to explain the privatisation process since the middle of 
the 18
th century. Only the index of geographical distribution of population seems to give a 
part of reason to Noorgard when he points out the contact with the urban world as a 
destabilising factor for the survival of the common property system. What is more, the impact 
of this variable in the redefinition of communal lands, more visible at provincial level than at 
local scale, could involve a social variant which should not be disregarded for future research. 
At present, the available data merely suggest that the forms of habitat had some type of 
influence on the privatisation process in Spain between 1750 and 1925. In econometric terms, 
however, their incidence is not significant enough so as to explain it by themselves.   32
  In reality, none of the variables tested here with the help of simple econometric 
methods demonstrates sufficient weight to establish an global and mechanical explanatory 
model of the privatisation process. Apart from seriously questioning Hardin’s Neo-
Malthusian thesis, which was my main objective, the regression exercises of the present paper 
only reveal that the factors that could really explain the property changes in the Spanish case 
have not all been checked here. It is true that, in the examination of the demographic 
assumption established by Hardin to explain the crisis of the commons, other more refined 
variables such as property distribution, forms of habitat or, even, the environmental setting 
have played a role. Some of them have even demonstrated to have a potential explanatory 
strength worth examining in future research. However, for this purpose I think it will be 
necessary to concentrate on the institutional, social and technical aspects: not only on the 
distribution of property but also on land sharing, tenancy models, inheritance systems, fiscal 
pressure, capacity of political negotiation or social differentiation among others. In my 
opinion, these hardly quantifiable variables and not Hardin’s demographic ones are destined 
to be the explanatory factors of greater weight in a consistent clarification of the historical 
dissolution of the communal system. 
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APPENDIX I 
Independent Variables: Determining Factors for Spanish Privatisation 
 
Provinces    A B C D E F G H  I  J 




















  %  Pp. / p.e.  ºC  Inh/Hec  Kg/Hec  %  (1-6)  %  Hec/Settlement  % 
              
Albacete  17.5 0.55 14.4 0.14 21.10  53.36  5 30.9  6,663  5.2 
Alicante  0.0 0.50 16.7 0.70 41.88  54.98  4 49.6  4,760  9.7 
Almería  30.6 0.47 15.9 0.36 36.76  95.85  4 52.3  6,094  4.9 
Ávila  61.4 1.24 12.0 0.21 86.50 41.80  3  4.0  1,998  4.8 
Badajoz  0.0 0.69 16.3 0.19 99.30  82.57  5 36.0  12,092  6.3 
Bal-Bar-Ger  (1)  11.9 0.96 14.1 0.70 56.79  81.08  4 40.1  2,075  14.1 
Burgos  23.6 0.96 10.9 0.24 66.01  40.03  1  7.6  1,244  4.4 
Cáceres  3.5 1.00 15.6 0.15 49.26  49.66  5 11.6  8,348  5.1 
Cádiz  0.0 0.98 17.3 0.54 99.51 31.25  6  81.4  13,778  12.8 
Canarias  21.1 0.50 17.9 0.32 35.15  40.02  3 23.8  2,069  4.8 
Castellón  13.7 0.74 14.7 0.40 47.69  71.55  1 37.0  4,069  5.0 
Ciudad  Real  2.4 0.63 14.5 0.13 24.18  44.64  5 42.7  14,897  6.2 
Cór-Hue-Sev  (2)  0.0 0.76 17.3 0.27 58.08  50.42  5 59.4  9,097  8.3 
Cor-Lug-Ore-Pon  (3)  19.1 2.05 12.7 0.61  141.93  32.75  1  6.3  186  4.6 
Cuenca  11.6 0.97 11.9 0.13 29.66 11.30  3  3.2  4,925  4.8 
Granada  51.6 0.59 15.9 0.35 38.91 64.10  5  42.3  4,566  7.8 
Guadalajara  58.8 0.89 11.8 0.17 40.33  25.33  1  3.8  2,571  5.2 
Huesca  29.5 1.21 12.3 0.17 37.50  61.96  1  9.4  1,992  4.6 
Jaén  20.2 0.80 15.8 0.27 36.11 86.79  5  49.9  8,821  5.0 
León  50.1 1.31 10.4 0.22 83.81 43.02  1  6.2  1,132  4.7 
Lérida  24.7 1.13 11.6 0.26 41.61 100.90  2  6.2  1,640 4.5 
Logroño  32.1 0.72 12.3 0.35 62.09 44.19  3  17.4  171  6.5 
Madrid  21.8 0.81 12.8 0.61 64.73  68.33  5 65.7  3,700  15.6 
Málaga  2.0 0.83 16.8 0.61 60.86 80.96  5  53.2  5,753  8.4 
Murcia  10.0 0.78 16.8 0.34 32.65  48.97  5 85.3  10,285  7.0 
Navarra  7.7 1.11 13.1 0.29 75.52  33.51  4 14.0  1,495  6.1 
Oviedo  23.4 1.64 12.7 0.51 140.71 53.21  1  11.2  355  5.0 
Palencia  23.8 1.09 10.1 0.23 60.98  21.64  4  7.0  3,816  7.3 
Salamanca  5.3 0.91 12.6 0.21 78.44  39.40  4 12.3  2,490  7.4 
Santander  19.0 1.79 12.9 0.41 120.22 46.78  1  17.1  718  5.9 
Segovia  41.3 0.80 11.8 0.21 73.06  11.21  3  6.9  2,000  7.2 
Soria  70.8 1.14  9.6 0.15 56.91 29.94  1  3.9  1,945  3.7 
Tarragona  2.4 0.68 15.2 0.51 27.60 71.93  3  29.3  2,552  8.0 
Teruel  61.9 0.58 12.7 0.16 41.76  24.15  1  7.5  4,970  5.3 
Toledo  3.0 0.59 14.9 0.21 46.70 28.17  5  16.0  6,923  6.1 
Valencia  6.0 0.62 15.6 0.57 37.28  53.43  3 38.7  3,044  10.0 
Valladolid  0.0 0.65 11.7 0.30 50.24  39.87  5 19.6  3,181  8.6 
Zamora  9.0 1.21 11.3 0.24 73.42  62.27  1  4.9  2,121  4.3 
Zaragoza  6.4 0.59 13.7 0.23 35.85  44.97  4 25.1  5,096  5.4 
              
SPAIN  (4)  20.4 0.91 13.8 0.32 59.26  50.33  3 26.6  1,378  6.7 
                
(1) Baleares, Bacelona and Gerona  (2) Córdoba, Huelva and Sevilla  (3) La Coruña, Lugo, Orense and Pontevedra (Galicia)  (4) There is no data for Basque provinces 
 
A.  Altitude index: percentage of surface higher than 1,001 metres over the total geographical surface 
  Sources: INE (2001) 
B.  Humidity index: precipitations/potential evapo-transpiration (annual average) 
  Sources: Elías Castillo and Ruiz Beltrán (1977) 
C.  Temperature index: annual average temperature (centigrade degrees) 
  Sources: Elías Castillo and Ruiz Beltrán (1977) 
D. Population  density  (1860): inhabitants/total hectares of geographical surface 
  Sources: Junta General de Estadística (1863) and INE (2001) 
E.  Livestock density (1865): kilogramme of live weight/total hectares of geographical surface 
  Sources: Junta General de Estadística (1868) and Flores de Lemus (1951) 
F.  Population growth (1787-1860): percentage variation of total population 
  Sources: INE (1981) and Junta General de Estadística (1863) 
G.  Property ranks (1956): ranks of percentages of small landowners with regard to the total agrarian working masculine population (1-6) 
  Sources: Sánchez Alonso (1995) 
H.  Urbanisation rate (1860): percentage of population in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants with regard to the total provincial population 
  Sources: Luna (1988) 
I.  Populating Distribution (1900): total hectares of geographical surface/number of settlement 
  Sources: INE (2001) and Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico y Estadístico (1904) 
J.  Industrial working population rate (1860): percentage of industrial working population with regard to the total provincial population 
  Sources: Junta General de Estadística (1863)   34
APPENDIX II 
Independent Variables: Determining Factors for Privatisation in Extremadura 
 
Judicial  Districts  A B C D E F G H I J K  L  M  N 
  Middle of 18th  Middle of 19th Growth 
 
Altitude  Humidity  Temper. 
Pop. 
Dist.  P. Density  L. Density  Urbanisat.  Ind. Pop.  P. Density  L. Density  Urbanisat.  Ind. Pop.  Population  Livestock 
  m  Pp./p.e.  ºC  Hec/Settl.  Inh/Hec  Kg/Hec  %  %  Inh/Hec  Kg/Hec  % % % % 
                      
Alburquerque  475 0.78 15.5  21,671  0.11 37.88  76.1  2.1  0.15 61.52  75.6  6.7  38.1 62.4 
Almendralejo  330 0.56 16.5  9,838  0.15 57.56  75.0  1.5  0.25 79.43  81.8  5.4  67.3 38.0 
Badajoz  230 0.58 16.6  53,954  0.11 47.51  98.6  4.4  0.16 54.22  88.5  10.5  41.3 14.1 
Castuera  475 0.57  9.2  14,074  0.09 37.14  64.0  2.3  0.16 66.04  76.5  3.3  81.5 77.8 
Don Benito  330 0.56 15.8  12,081  0.12 40.83  84.7  1.7  0.23 73.03  79.6  8.1  90.5 78.9 
Fregenal de la Sierra  690 1.13 14.8  11,448  0.19 83.71  75.9  2.1  0.29 83.46  81.7  3.7  57.6 -0.3 
Fuente de Cantos  690 0.72 15.4  11,928  0.12 64.45  73.2  1.3  0.19 79.66  73.5  5.0  57.1 23.6 
Herrera del Duque  475 0.84 16.4  14,783  0.06 26.80  48.3  1.6  0.10 45.88  53.5  2.6  71.2 71.2 
Jerez de los Caballeros  475 0.82 16.5  13,016  0.17 76.74  83.5  2.4  0.21 76.54  81.8  4.9  23.2 -0.3 
Llerena  580 0.69 14.6  11,863  0.12 52.14  52.4  2.5  0.15 60.18  55.9  5.4  22.9 15.4 
Mérida  230 0.59 17.0  7,897  0.11 45.31  40.4  1.9  0.18 59.37  51.8  5.5  58.6 31.0 
Olivenza  330 0.62 17.5  10,218  0.11 46.20  59.6  1.7  0.16 80.47  65.8  11.2  54.2 74.2 
Puebla de Alcocer  475 0.69 17.1  10,310  0.08 34.38  17.6  1.1  0.13 62.55  46.9  3.9  67.0 81.9 
Villanueva de la Serena  400 0.50 17.4  10,510  0.15 74.73  67.1  1.4  0.30 89.56  85.0  13.6  100.0 19.8 
Zafra  475 0.72 15.4  7,311  0.30 82.60  64.5  3.0  0.41 93.19  80.8  6.6  35.2 12.8 
BADAJOZ (Province)  444 0.69 15.7  12,096  0.13 53.87  65.4  2.1  0.20 71.01  71.9  6.4  57.7 40.0 
                     
Alcántara  350 0.72 14.0  17,199  0.11 63.28  89.9  3.8  0.14 51.01  88.8  4.7  27.3 -19.4 
Cáceres  475 0.64 16.1  22,348  0.10 41.24  75.0  3.9  0.14 46.22  82.4  7.8  48.8 12.1 
Coria  275 0.68 17.6  5,919  0.13 48.58  21.7  3.7  0.18 66.89  37.7  5.3  41.8 37.7 
Garrovillas  330 0.85 16.5  10,405  0.13 37.70  50.3  3.3  0.14 47.97  42.7  7.9  11.4 27.2 
Hervás  475 1.37 14.2  4,751  0.12 39.36  13.5  2.4  0.19 47.50  14.9  5.9  52.1 20.7 
Hoyos  750 1.54 14.2  5,926  0.15 29.62  11.9  2.9  0.20 52.98  11.6  4.9  31.2 78.9 
Jarandilla  850 1.62 14.2  4,966  0.21 55.08  27.1  3.3  0.22 67.38  20.8  3.2  5.8 22.3 
Logrosán  580 0.93 15.6  14,208  0.07 21.72  16.9  3.3  0.09 40.63  50.5  3.5  31.3 87.1 
Montánchez  475 0.78 15.8  5,161  0.22 72.38  40.8  1.9  0.28 78.94  42.2  4.7  25.5 9.1 
Navalmoral de la Mata  400 0.97 16.2  6,902  0.09 27.58  33.1  4.9  0.10 35.97  8.5  4.2  16.3 30.4 
Plasencia  475 1.13 15.9  7,533  0.12 47.55  40.4  3.4  0.15 47.45  46.7  5.4  21.6 -0.2 
Trujillo  580 0.78 16.4  9,090  0.09 43.42  49.9  2.9  0.15 51.36  49.5  3.9  55.6 18.3 
Valencia de Alcántara  400 0.73 16.1  15,484  0.08 26.49  35.8  2.6  0.12 50.64  46.2  3.6  44.8 91.1 
CÁCERES (Province)  493 0.98 15.6  8,534  0.13 42.62  38.9  3.2  0.16 52.69  41.7  5.0  31.8 31.9 
                   
EXTREMADURA  469 0.83 15.6  1,798  0.13 48.24  52.2  2.7  0.18 61.85  56.8  4.7  44.8 36.0 
                       
 
A.  Altitude index: average altitude over the sea level (metres) 
  Sources: Junta de Extremadura (2000) 
B.  Humidity index: annual average humidity (precipitations/potential evapo-transpiration) 
  Sources: Elías Castillo and Ruiz Beltrán (1977) 
C.  Temperature index: annual average temperature (centigrade degrees) 
  Sources: Elías Castillo and Ruiz Beltrán (1977) 
D.  Population distribution (1900): total hectares of geographical surface/number of settlements 
  Sources: Junta de Extremadura (2000) and Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico y Estadístico (1904) 
E. Population  density  (1750): inhabitants/total hectares of geographical surface 
  Sources: Linares (2002) 
F.  Livestock density (1750): kilogramme of live weight/total hectares of geographical surface 
  Sources: Linares (2002) 
G.  Urbanisation rate (1750): percentage of population in municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants over the total population 
  Sources: Linares (2002) 
H.  Industrial working population (1750): percentage of industrial working population with regard to the total population 
  Sources: Melón Jiménez (1996) 
I. Population  density  (1860): inhabitants/total hectares of geographical surface 
  Sources: Linares (2002) 
J.  Livestock density (1865): kilogramme of live weight/total hectares of geographical surface 
  Sources: Linares (2002) 
K.  Urbanisation rate (1860): percentage of population in municipalities with more than 2,500 inhabitants over the total population 
  Sources: Junta General de Estadística (1863) 
L.  Industrial working population rate (1860): percentage of industrial working population with regard to the total population 
  Sources: Junta General de Estadística (1863). 
M.  Population growth (1750-1860): percentage variation of total population 
  Sources: Linares (2002) 
N.  Livestock growth (1750-1865): percentage variation of total live weight 
  Sources: Linares (2002)   35
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